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NUANCE, TECHNOLOGY, AND THE FOURTH AMENDMENT: 
A RESPONSE TO PREDICTIVE POLICING AND REASONABLE 
SUSPICION 
Fabio Arcila, Jr.∗ 
ABSTRACT 
In an engaging critique, Professor Arcila finds that Professor Ferguson is 
correct in that predictive policing will likely be incorporated into Fourth 
Amendment law and that it will alter reasonable suspicion determinations. But 
Professor Arcila also argues that the potential incorporation of predictive 
policing reflects a larger deficiency in our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence 
and that it should not be adopted because it fails to adequately consider and 
respect a broader range of protected interests. 
INTRODUCTION 
Neither doctrinal nor theoretical nuance is a strength of our Fourth 
Amendment jurisprudence. Consequently, though I believe Professor Ferguson 
correctly forecasts that predictive policing will be incorporated into Fourth 
Amendment law and will alter reasonable suspicion determinations,1 that 
outcome is sufficiently perilous that I will tilt against it. I have previously 
contended that an important deficiency in our Fourth Amendment 
jurisprudence is its failure to adequately consider and respect a broader range 
of protected interests.2 That same problem is likely to make the incorporation 
of predictive policing problematic. 
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 © 2014 Fabio Arcila, Jr., Professor of Law and Associate Dean for Research and Scholarship, Touro 
Law Center. Thanks to Rebecca Drane Wood for her editing suggestions, and to my research assistants who 
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1
 Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Predictive Policing and Reasonable Suspicion, 62 EMORY L.J. 259, 263 
(2012) (“[I]n its idealized form, predictive policing will impact reasonable suspicion analysis and become an 
important factor in a court’s Fourth Amendment calculus.”); id. at 288 (“Predictive policing technologies 
will . . . [be added] to the totality of circumstances from which courts can find reasonable suspicion for a 
seizure. . . . [These] will end up being seen as a ‘plus factor’ . . . .”); id. at 304 (“Certainly an accurate 
prediction of a particular crime, in a specific location, should have some effect on police officers and courts.”); 
id. at 312 (“Predictive policing will impact the reasonable suspicion calculus by becoming a factor within the 
totality of circumstances test.”); see id. at 305. But see id. at 304 (stating it is “too soon to evaluate” whether 
“predictive forecast [is] appropriate to consider in the totality of circumstances”). 
 
2
 Fabio Arcila, Jr., The Death of Suspicion, 51 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1275, 1324‒26 (2010). 
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We may be better off in the aggregate if predictive policing is excluded 
from the suspicion determination for numerous reasons having constitutional 
implications, as I will explain below. This is not a Luddite position. I do not 
argue for ignoring or discarding predictive policing. To the contrary, police 
may still take advantage of a key benefit of predictive policing—highly 
improved resource allocation—that results from technological advances and 
improved criminological research. Predictive policing’s value will be in telling 
someone like Officer McFadden from Terry v. Ohio3 where to invest time and 
observational efforts. That benefit, in and of itself, makes predictive policing 
invaluable to police and communities.4 Limiting predictive policing’s use this 
way, so that it does not alter the suspicion determination in the way Professor 
Ferguson anticipates, will ensure that predictive policing is not used as a 
constitutionally illegitimate, shortcut replacement to the type of patient, 
observant work that Officer McFadden did. 
I. DISCUSSION 
A. Understanding Suspicion 
Professor Ferguson glosses over the distinction between probable cause and 
reasonable suspicion, but this distinction can be important in assessing 
predictive policing’s role in Fourth Amendment law. Terry makes reasonable 
suspicion sufficient to justify the seizure of a person, which is why Professor 
Ferguson understandably focuses upon it. But as a consequence, he makes only 
passing references to probable cause, such as in his description that “[i]n order 
to interfere with a person’s Fourth Amendment rights, law enforcement 
officers must have either probable cause to search or reasonable suspicion to 
seize an individual.”5 Though a defensible statement of the law, it is also an 
odd formulation that suggests a nonexistent binary distinction between search 
law and seizure law. Probable cause is not the only available justification for a 
search; reasonable suspicion can justify a search as well.6 Reasonable 
 
 
3
 392 U.S. 1, 1 (1968). 
 
4
 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 276 (“Crime may go down simply by establishing a police presence in 
an area.”). 
 
5
 Id. at 286 (emphasis added). 
 
6
 The Terry Court declared reasonable suspicion sufficient to justify a “stop and frisk,” which 
automatically allows one search—an investigative questioning in conjunction with the initial “stop”/seizure—
and potentially a second search if the facts justify a “frisk” for weapons. See Terry, 392 U.S. at 1‒22, 30; see 
also Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1035 (1983) (“We hold that the protective search of [an automobile’s] 
passenger compartment was reasonable under the principles articulated in Terry . . . .”). 
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suspicion is not necessarily sufficient to seize an individual. Reasonable 
suspicion sometimes suffices, in the limited circumstances that Terry 
delineates.7 But Terry is a special rule. When Terry’s limited circumstances are 
not present, Fourth Amendment law reverts back to the default rule that 
probable cause, at a minimum, is generally required to seize an individual.8 
Reasonable suspicion’s limited role is both substantive and important. 
Terry’s reasonable suspicion standard applies only to completed felonies or 
imminent crime9 (and its frisk authority applies only when a concern about 
violence exists10). As Professor Ferguson ably explains, predictive policing 
comes in many varieties, and not all of them will be sufficiently informative 
about imminence to satisfy Terry. In these instances, reasonable suspicion will 
not be available to justify a governmental seizure. To know whether the 
imminence requirement is satisfied, specific information about the police 
prediction will be required. 
This need for specific information raises at least two difficult issues. The 
first issue concerns the prediction’s temporal limits.11 To know whether 
imminence is satisfied, litigants and courts must know the specific time period 
to which the prediction applies. Presumably, three months should not satisfy 
imminence, but will three weeks, three days, or three hours? The technological 
advance that predictive policing represents will pressure reluctant courts to 
make clearer pronouncements about what qualifies as imminence. These 
determinations, however, are likely to be so fact specific as to obfuscate any 
generally applicable guidance about imminence standards. Thus, they may fail 
to meaningfully limit search discretion, though better limits are sorely 
needed.12 
 
 
7
 See infra notes 9–10 and accompanying text. 
 
8
 See United States v. Valerio, 718 F.3d 1321, 1324 (11th Cir. 2013) (“[T]he Fourth Amendment’s 
default rule [is] that all seizures must be supported by probable cause . . . .”). 
 
9
 See Arizona v. Johnson, 555 U.S. 323, 326 (2009) (instructing that a Terry stop is lawful “when the 
police officer reasonably suspects that the person apprehended is committing or has committed a criminal 
offense”); United States v. Hensley, 469 U.S. 221, 229 (1985) (holding that a Terry stop is justified when 
police encounter “a person . . . [who] was involved in or is wanted in connection with a completed felony”); 
Terry, 392 U.S. at 30 (holding that reasonable suspicion suffices under the Fourth Amendment “where a police 
officer observes unusual conduct which leads him reasonably to conclude . . . that criminal activity may be 
afoot” (emphasis added)). 
 
10
 See Terry, 392 U.S. at 23–24, 28–30. 
 
11
 See infra notes 44–45 and accompanying text. 
 
12
 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 323 & nn.333–34. 
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The second issue concerns the specific manner in which the prediction was 
generated. Outputs are only as good as the method for producing them. Thus, 
as Professor Ferguson points out, assessing the legitimacy of a particular police 
prediction will require peering behind the curtains of how it was produced.13 
This will be true with regard to imminence when reasonable suspicion is 
invoked to justify the seizure. Professor Ferguson notes complications that may 
arise here, such as claims of a nondisclosure right due to proprietary interests,14 
and I am pessimistic about achieving the transparency that should be required 
before predictive policing is incorporated into Fourth Amendment law.15 
Regardless of whether probable cause or reasonable suspicion is at issue, 
incorporating predictive policing into the suspicion determination can raise 
constitutional concerns because predictive policing can change the nature of 
suspicion itself. Traditional suspicion has served as a useful protective concept 
because it has encouraged searchers to think in the particularized terms that the 
Fourth Amendment favors by targeting a specific individual based upon a 
conglomeration of generally retroactive information, such as what was 
previously said or done. These two factors—particularity and retroactivity—
are powerfully protective because they serve to forcefully limit search 
discretion. 
Predictive policing is instead general and prospective. It encourages 
generalized targeting—not specific to any particular individual—based upon 
prospective information—a prognostication about what may occur within a 
particular time period. Indeed, this is its attraction; it is why predictive policing 
works differently and is so enticing. 
In this realization lies a cautionary tale because incorporating predictive 
policing into the suspicion determination changes the nature of suspicion from 
generally being particularized and retrospective to always being generalized 
and prospective.16 Fourth Amendment history is marked by a hostility to 
generalized searches. The Fourth Amendment was adopted in large measure to 
ban general warrants,17 and the Fourth Amendment is best interpreted as 
 
 
13
 See id. at 319–20. 
 
14
 Id. at 319. 
 
15
 See infra note 45. 
 
16
 Note, however, the potential for predictive policing’s generalized nature to change, becoming more 
particularized as technology improves. See Andrew Guthrie Ferguson, Big Data and Predictive Reasonable 
Suspicion, 163 U. PA. L. REV. (forthcoming 2014), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm? 
abstract_id=2394683.  
 
17
 Arcila, supra note 2, at 1281–83 & nn.10–11. 
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providing protections against generalized dragnet searches.18 Predictive 
policing, however, can come perilously close to mini-dragnet searches of 
designated, possibly small areas. 
The potentially saving factor is the possibility of corroboration.19 Professor 
Ferguson mentions several forms of corroboration, such as witnessing 
someone peering into parked car windows or carrying a screwdriver where 
there is a concern for car thefts, or carrying a large duffle bag where there is a 
concern about burglaries.20 The validity of incorporating predictive policing 
into suspicion determinations rests in large measure upon how stringent the 
corroboration requirement will be. 
From a conceptual standpoint, predictive policing’s hallmarks of generality 
and prospectivity should often call for demanding corroboration requirements. 
In a retroactive context, corroboration confirms preexisting knowledge and the 
predictions that flow from it, usually in a manner that promotes particularity 
because a specific person is initially targeted. This dynamic sequentially 
improves reliability as more corroboration accumulates, which increases the 
degree of confidence that the proper person is being targeted for a seizure or 
search.21 In a prospective context, corroboration confirms predictions that flow 
from preexisting data but in a generalized manner in which the initial focus is 
not on any specific person. This dynamic can also sequentially improve 
reliability as more corroboration accumulates, but the unparticularized starting 
point corresponds with greater initial unreliability, which suggests that more 
corroboration should be required as a counterbalance.22 Predictive policing’s 
utility in targeting smaller geographic areas—and its potential to increasingly 
target even smaller areas23—does not undermine this conclusion. This is 
because geographic specificity does not, in and of itself, contribute to validly 
 
 
18
 See Christopher Slobogin, Government Dragnets, 73 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 107, 109‒10, 143 
(Summer 2010). For example, the Supreme Court in Delaware v. Prouse correctly held that it violates the 
Fourth Amendment for police to engage in random, suspicionless traffic stops to run license plate checks. 440 
U.S. 648, 663 (1979). The Court, however, suggested that less discretionary alternatives, such as the 
“[q]uestioning of all oncoming traffic at roadblock-type stops” might be “one possible alternative.” Id. In 
dissent, Justice Rhenquist rightly mocked this “misery loves company” theory of the Fourth Amendment. Id. at 
664 (Rhenquist, J., dissenting). 
 
19
 See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 303 (explaining that predictive policing “must be corroborated by direct 
police observation”); id. at 307 (“The key remains the observations that corroborate the tip.”). 
 
20
 Id. at 261, 309, 314. 
 
21
 Id. at 287 (noting the “individualized” requirement for suspicion). 
 
22
 See id. at 307 (“[T]he information in the computer is generalized, and that fact makes it less reliable.”). 
 
23
 See id. at 303, 311‒12. 
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establishing probable cause or reasonable suspicion.24 Fourth Amendment 
particularity is not a geographic concept.25 Thus, more demanding 
corroboration requirements should generally be imposed because otherwise 
predictive policing poses a real danger to Fourth Amendment protections, 
especially with regard to the particularity requirement that is fundamental to 
restraining search discretion. Consequently, we will be better off—and Fourth 
Amendment protections will be better respected—if courts generally reject 
Professor Ferguson’s contention that when predictive policing is at issue 
“police may actually need less corroboration in their observations.”26 
Imposing more demanding corroboration requirements in the context of 
predictive policing will be difficult because current Fourth Amendment 
corroboration requirements are already lax. This problem can be seen in 
Illinois v. Gates27 and Alabama v. White,28 two Supreme Court cases that 
Professor Ferguson discusses.29 In Gates, which concerns probable cause,30 as 
well as in White, which concerns reasonable suspicion,31 the Court was 
insufficiently demanding with regard to corroboration. In each case, the Court 
deemed there to be adequate corroboration while ignoring crucial temporal 
considerations.32 In Gates, inadequate corroboration existed without knowing 
whether the Gates were driving directly back to their Chicago-area home from 
Florida.33 But one cannot learn from the record when police sought the search 
warrant for the Gates’ home, and thus it is impossible to determine the Gates’ 
location at that moment on their return route. In the absence of this 
information, and as the dissenting Justices suggested,34 the Gates could have 
been driving anywhere in northern Florida or to any other location in the 
country, and either possibility would have materially undermined a probable 
cause finding. Similarly, adequate corroboration was lacking in White until it 
 
 
24
 See id. at 292 (agreeing that suspicion requires “individualization, corroboration, [and] particularized 
detail”); see also id. at 306, 310. 
 
25
 See id. at 305 (“[A] predictive policing ‘tip’ is not particularized to an individual.”). 
 
26
 Id. at 308. To be fair to Professor Ferguson, I acknowledge that he made this assertion while speaking 
about predictive policing in a particular context—as applied to a specific geographic area—rather than 
generally. But because I fear that others will not be as careful as he is, I think it useful to make my point 
generally. 
 
27
 462 U.S. 213 (1983). 
 
28
 496 U.S. 325 (1990). 
 
29
 Ferguson, supra note 1, at 289‒91. 
 
30
 See 462 U.S. at 230. 
 
31
 496 U.S. at 326‒27. 
 
32
 See id. at 331; Gates, 462 U.S. at 243‒46. 
 
33
 462 U.S. at 292 & n.3 (Stevens, J., dissenting). 
 
34
 See id.; see also id. at 274 (Brennan, J., dissenting) (joining Justice Stevens’s dissent). 
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was known whether White was driving to Dobey’s Motel, but police stopped 
her car before it could arrive there.35 Though the majority took shelter in her 
driving “the most direct route to Dobey’s Motel,”36 a decision truly respectful 
of Fourth Amendment protections would have required police to wait to see if 
she actually arrived there, particularly because such a delay would have been 
apparently risk-free given the facts of the case. 
Predictive policing might fundamentally undermine the Fourth 
Amendment’s protections as historically and currently conceived. This risk is 
especially acute if predictive policing is incorporated into suspicion 
determinations without adequate sensitivity to many nuances,37 such as the 
ones Professor Ferguson identifies,38 as well as others, such as the distinction 
between our traditional suspicion models, which are retrospective and 
particularized, and predictive policing’s generalized and prospective suspicion 
paradigm. Accepting the legitimacy of predictive policing may require more 
than accepting an evolving Fourth Amendment. It may require sufficient 
agreement that we want a new Fourth Amendment. 
B. Likelihood of Insufficient Safeguards 
The difficulty in developing a new Fourth Amendment that incorporates 
predictive policing is that, though we can conceivably fashion it to provide 
levels of protection commensurate with our history and traditions, properly 
dealing with the variety of predictive policing programs and the varying 
contexts to which they are applied will require an attention and responsiveness 
to nuance that Fourth Amendment law has not been able to achieve and is not 
well placed to ensure. It will also require an expertise that lawyers are unlikely 
to have or be able to master. While legislation provides an alternate route for 
assuring Fourth Amendment protections, I am not optimistic about that 
process. Thus, though predictive policing should be approached cautiously and 
with care, I fear that goal is unlikely to be met. 
Professor Ferguson does an admirable job of explaining predictive 
policing’s nuances, and of acknowledging many of the safeguards that should 
be implemented in response to it.39 As Professor Ferguson explains, predictive 
 
 
35
 496 U.S. at 327. 
 
36
 Id. 
 
37
 This is a point on which Professor Ferguson and I appear to agree. See Ferguson, supra note 1, at 265 
(suggesting that predictive policing should not “unthinkingly” be applied in new contexts). 
 
38
 Id. at 314‒20. 
 
39
 Id. at 314‒16, 319. 
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policing is a unifying term that masks extensive variety in the data and 
methodologies used, types of crime considered and predicted, and reliability of 
results. Consequently, I certainly agree with him that predictive policing 
programs should not “unthinkingly” be applied to new contexts.40 
Unfortunately, I predict that this is likely to occur, and also that it is unlikely 
that the necessary safeguards will be adequately implemented. 
Take, for example, the necessity of transparency with regard to predictive 
policing.41 Professor Ferguson suggests that transparency might be addressed 
“outside the courtroom,” such as through “[i]ndependent oversight boards, 
audits, and other methods to test and retest the data collection and analysis.”42 
While a helpful suggestion, this will not displace both an interest and need 
during litigation for discovery about the applicable predictive policing system 
and its results. However, abundant reasons exist to be pessimistic about the 
adequacy of either nonjudicial or judicial mechanisms to provide sufficient 
oversight and quality control over predictive policing. For example, given the 
technological complexity of predictive policing, the potential size of the 
enterprise, and a powerful free-market ethos, there is every reason to expect 
private business to enter the fray, looking to profit from governmental entities’ 
desire to benefit from this new technology. Already, private enterprise is at the 
forefront of other big data exercises. As private enterprise enters the field, 
claims of proprietary information will increase, as Professor Ferguson 
acknowledges.43 As this occurs, the adequacy of oversight—such as to analyze 
code, algorithms, and underlying data—seems quite unlikely unless a powerful 
mechanism exists for assuring it, such as guaranteeing access to the underlying 
information by statute. 
Legislation could also have an important role with regard to predictive 
policing in other ways. For example, the degree to which predictive policing is 
usefully incorporated into suspicion determinations depends upon the validity 
of the data upon which it is based,44 and upon the likelihood that the resulting 
prediction is correct. Legislation could be particularly useful in identifying the 
required confidence levels and/or error rates that should be acceptable in 
 
 
40
 See supra note 37. 
 
41
 Ferguson, supra note 1, at 316‒20. 
 
42
 Id. at 320. 
 
43
 See supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 
44
 Ferguson, supra note 1, at 317‒18. 
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predictive policing. This is particularly so because existing law is extremely 
deficient in these respects.45 
Professor Ferguson could advance his predictive policing project by, for 
instance, proposing model legislation. Unfortunately, all such efforts might be 
for naught, as the widespread agreement necessary to implement strong 
legislation seems remote given the propensity to sacrifice privacy for potential 
security. 
CONCLUSION 
For several years, struggles concerning technology have marked the 
Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment docket, and Professor Ferguson’s 
admirable work on predictive policing suggests that this struggle will continue. 
Technological progress is tantalizing in part because of the increased 
efficiency it promises. The debate over predictive policing again raises the 
issue of whether the Fourth Amendment properly requires some law 
enforcement inefficiency to safeguard constitutional values and, if so, how to 
provide those protections. 
 
 
 
45
 For example, Fourth Amendment law provides virtually no safeguards over data entry due to the good-
faith doctrine and the exclusionary rule’s emasculation. See Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 140‒43, 
146‒47 (2009); id. at 153‒57 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). Fourth Amendment law appears similarly weak with 
regard to confidence levels and/or error rates. See Mich. Dep’t of State Police v. Sitz, 496 U.S. 444, 454‒55 
(1990) (accepting a 1.6% success rate for a dragnet search, and approvingly commenting upon search success 
rates of 0.12%, 0.5%, and approximately 1%). 
Discovery in criminal litigation is also sufficiently weak that significant deficiencies in forensic quality 
control, for example, are persistently discovered only after extended time periods. See United States v. 
Wilkins, 943 F. Supp. 2d 248, 251‒52 (D. Mass. 2013); Mark Hansen, Crimes in the Lab, A.B.A. J., Sept. 
2013, at 44; Joseph Goldstein, New York Sees Errors on DNA in Rape Cases, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 11, 2013, at 
A1. 
